The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting

Marina Bánnikova and José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez ()
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Marina Bánnikova: Department of Economics and Economic History, BGSE, Block B, UAB Campus, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra, Spain
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez: Departament d’Economia and ECO-SOS, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Av. Universitat 1, 43204 Reus, Spain

Games, 2022, vol. 13, issue 6, 1-8

Abstract: This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents’ decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following novelty: each voter has a subjective deadline—a moment in time when he/she prefers immediate agreement on any alternative, rather than future agreement on his/her most-preferred alternative. Our key finding shows that patience is not necessarily a main attribute of strategic advantage. When the first voter is the same at every stage, this voter will obtain his/her preferred alternative, even if he/she is the least patient one. However, this first movement advantage disappears when agents alternate as the first voter of each stage: in this case, the most patient voter always wins.

Keywords: sequential voting; fixed ordering; alternate ordering; subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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