Measuring the Difficulties in Forming a Coalition Government

Tobias Hiller ()
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Tobias Hiller: Department of Microeconomics, University Leipzig, 04109 Leipzig, Germany

Games, 2023, vol. 14, issue 2, 1-15

Abstract: Electoral thresholds in the context of parliamentary elections are an instrument for preventing the fragmentation of parliaments and facilitate the formation of a coalition government. However, the clauses also introduce distortions and modify the equality of electoral votes in an election. In order to decide to what extent these negative effects can be accepted, it is necessary to measure the difficulties in forming a coalition government and to quantify the effects of electoral thresholds on these difficulties. For this issue, we introduce a concept based on cooperative game theory which takes into account the distribution of seats in parliament and coalition statements of parties.

Keywords: voting power; electoral thresholds; concentration measure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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