Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game

Chirantan Ganguly and Indrajit Ray ()
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Chirantan Ganguly: Queen’s Management School, Queen’s University Belfast, 185 Stranmillis Road, Belfast BT9 5EE, UK

Games, 2023, vol. 14, issue 3, 1-14

Abstract: In the Crawford–Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a simple mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of the N possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the mediator suggests one of the N actions to the uninformed decision-maker according to the probability distribution of the device. We show that no such simple mediated equilibrium can improve upon the unmediated N -partition Crawford–Sobel equilibrium when the preference divergence parameter (bias) is small.

Keywords: cheap talk; mediated equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Related works:
Working Paper: Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game (2009)
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