Some Properties of Interval Shapley Values: An Axiomatic Analysis

Shinichi Ishihara and Junnosuke Shino
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Shinichi Ishihara: Waseda Institute of Political Economy (WINPEC), Waseda University, 1-6-1 Nishiwaseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, Japan

Games, 2023, vol. 14, issue 3, 1-10

Abstract: Interval games are an extension of cooperative coalitional games, in which players are assumed to face payoff uncertainty. Characteristic functions thus assign a closed interval instead of a real number. This study revisits two interval game versions of Shapley values (i.e., the interval Shapley value and the interval Shapley-like value) and characterizes them using an axiomatic approach. For the interval Shapley value, we show that the existing axiomatization can be generalized to a wider subclass of interval games called size monotonic games. For the interval Shapley-like value, we show that a standard axiomatization using Young’s strong monotonicity holds on the whole class of interval games.

Keywords: cooperative interval games; interval uncertainty; Shapley value; axiomatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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