Border Games: A Game Theoretic Model of Undocumented Immigration

Julide Yazar () and Robert J. Gitter
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Julide Yazar: Department of Economics, Ohio Wesleyan University, Corns Building, Delaware, OH 43015, USA
Robert J. Gitter: Department of Economics, Ohio Wesleyan University, Corns Building, Delaware, OH 43015, USA

Games, 2023, vol. 14, issue 5, 1-19

Abstract: We consider a game-theoretic model of undocumented immigration with the aim of emphasizing the strategic interaction between the different forces affecting the issue. Specifically, we analyze the strategic interaction between firms in the destination country, native labor, the elected officials in the destination country, and the undocumented immigrants from the Source Country. We show that the impact of border enforcement is dampened because strategic interaction between the players will tend to mute any unilateral changes. We also study the effect of uncertainty in the labor market on migration issues and analyze the two cases where policymakers have to make their decisions before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the market state is realized.

Keywords: game theory; choice under uncertainty; undocumented immigration; labor economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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