Cooperation and Coordination in Threshold Public Goods Games with Asymmetric Players
Xinmiao An,
Yali Dong,
Xiaomin Wang and
Boyu Zhang ()
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Xinmiao An: Laboratory of Mathematics and Complex Systems, Ministry of Education, School of Mathematical Sciences, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China
Yali Dong: School of Systems Science, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China
Xiaomin Wang: Laboratory of Mathematics and Complex Systems, Ministry of Education, School of Mathematical Sciences, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China
Boyu Zhang: Laboratory of Mathematics and Complex Systems, Ministry of Education, School of Mathematical Sciences, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China
Games, 2023, vol. 14, issue 6, 1-13
Abstract:
In this paper, we study cooperation and coordination in a threshold public goods game with asymmetric players where players have different endowments e i , productivities p i , and rewards r i . In general, this game has a defective Nash equilibrium (NE), in which no one contributes, and multiple cooperative NEs, in which the group’s collective contribution equals the threshold. We then study how multiple dimensions of inequality influence people’s cooperation and coordination. We show that heterogeneity in e i p i can promote cooperation in the sense that the existence condition of the defective NE becomes stricter. Furthermore, players with higher e i p i are likely to contribute more at a cooperative NE in terms of collective contribution (i.e., absolute contribution multiplied by productivity).
Keywords: threshold public goods game; asymmetric game; cooperation; coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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