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Equilibrium Selection in Hawk–Dove Games

Mario Blázquez de Paz () and Nikita Koptyug
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Mario Blázquez de Paz: Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics, 5045 Bergen, Norway
Nikita Koptyug: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden

Games, 2023, vol. 15, issue 1, 1-30

Abstract: We apply three equilibrium selection techniques to study which equilibrium is selected in a hawk–dove game with a multiplicity of equilibria. By using a uniform-price auction as an illustrative example, we find that when the demand in the auction is low or intermediate, the tracing procedure method of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and the quantal response method of McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) select the same equilibrium. When the demand is high, the tracing procedure method does not select any equilibrium, but the quantal response method still selects the same equilibrium as when the demand is low or intermediate. The robustness to strategic uncertainty method of Andersson, Argenton and Weibull (2014) selects two of the multiple equilibria irrespective of the demand size. We also analyze the impact of an increase in the minimum bid allowed by the auctioneer in the equilibrium selection.

Keywords: hawk–dove games; equilibrium selection; tracing procedure method; robustness to strategic uncertainty method; quantal response method (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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