Invariant Equilibrium in Discontinuous Bayesian Games

Blake A. Allison and Jason J. Lepore ()
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Blake A. Allison: Department of Economics, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA
Jason J. Lepore: Department of Economics, Orfalea College of Business, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, CA 93407, USA

Games, 2024, vol. 15, issue 3, 1-14

Abstract: We provide sufficient conditions on the primitives of a class of discontinuous Bayesian games such that all games in the class share equilibria. If a Bayesian game in the class also satisfies a weak efficiency condition, then we show its normal form is better-reply secure. The invariance property then provides an existence result for all Bayesian games in the class. Results are shown for both pure strategy and behavioral strategy equilibrium. We illustrate the application of the results with an example of a class of contests with bid caps.

Keywords: discontinuous Bayesian game; invariance; equilibrium existence; random superior payoff matching; random weak efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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