Vulnerability and Defence: A Case for Stackelberg Game Dynamics
Azhar Iqbal (),
Ishan Honhaga,
Eyoel Teffera,
Anthony Perry,
Robin Baker,
Glen Pearce and
Claudia Szabo
Additional contact information
Azhar Iqbal: School of Computer and Mathematical Sciences, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia
Ishan Honhaga: School of Computer and Mathematical Sciences, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia
Eyoel Teffera: Defence Science and Technology Group, P.O. Box 1500, Edinburgh, SA 5111, Australia
Anthony Perry: Defence Science and Technology Group, P.O. Box 1500, Edinburgh, SA 5111, Australia
Robin Baker: Defence Science and Technology Group, P.O. Box 1500, Edinburgh, SA 5111, Australia
Glen Pearce: Defence Science and Technology Group, P.O. Box 1500, Edinburgh, SA 5111, Australia
Claudia Szabo: School of Computer and Mathematical Sciences, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia
Games, 2024, vol. 15, issue 5, 1-13
Abstract:
This paper examines the tactical interaction between drones and tanks in modern warfare through game theory, particularly focusing on Stackelberg equilibrium and backward induction. It describes a high-stakes conflict between two teams: one using advanced drones for attack, and the other defending using tanks. The paper conceptualizes this as a sequential game, illustrating the complex strategic dynamics similar to Stackelberg competition, where moves and countermoves are carefully analyzed and predicted.
Keywords: Stackelberg equilibrium; sequential games; backwards-induction outcome (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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