Two-Valued Strongly Group Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions

Anna De Simone () and K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao
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Anna De Simone: Dipartimento di Matematica e Applicazioni R. Caccioppoli, Università Federico II di Napoli, 80126 Napoli, Italy
K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao: Department of Computer Information Systems, Indiana University Northwest, Gary, IN 46408, USA

Games, 2024, vol. 15, issue 6, 1-9

Abstract: We present simple and direct arguments to characterize strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions whose range is of cardinality two. The underlying society is of arbitrary cardinality, and agents can be indifferent among alternatives.

Keywords: social choice functions; weak preferences; weak manipulability; veto rule; serial dictator (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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