A Model of k -Winners

Diego Armando Canales ()
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Diego Armando Canales: Escuela de Ciencias Sociales y Gobierno, Tecnologico de Monterrey, Ave. Eugenio Garza Sada 2501 Sur, Colonia Tecnológico, Monterrey 64700, Mexico

Games, 2025, vol. 16, issue 1, 1-15

Abstract: The concept of the Condorcet winner has become central to most electoral models in the political economy literature. A Condorcet winner is the alternative preferred by a plurality in every pairwise competition; the notion of a k -winner generalizes that of a Condorcet winner. The k -winner is the unique alternative top-ranked by the plurality in every competition comprising exactly k alternatives (including itself). This study uses a spatial voting setting to characterize this theoretical concept, showing that if a k -winner exists for some k > 2 , then the same alternative must be the k ′ -winner for every k ′ > k . We derive additional results, including sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of a k -winner for some k > 2 .

Keywords: elections; k-winners; Condorcet winner (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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