Analysis of the Competition of the South-Eastern Railway of Peru Through a Timetable Auction

Augusto Aliaga-Miranda, Luis Ricardo Flores-Vilcapoma (), Christian Efrain Raqui-Ramirez, José Luis Claudio-Pérez, Yadira Yanase-Rojas and Jovany Pompilio Espinoza-Yangali
Additional contact information
Augusto Aliaga-Miranda: School of Business, Universidad Nacional Intercultural de la Selva Central Juan Santos Atahualpa, La Merced 12856, Peru
Luis Ricardo Flores-Vilcapoma: School of Business, Universidad Nacional Intercultural de la Selva Central Juan Santos Atahualpa, La Merced 12856, Peru
Christian Efrain Raqui-Ramirez: School of Business, Universidad Nacional Intercultural de la Selva Central Juan Santos Atahualpa, La Merced 12856, Peru
José Luis Claudio-Pérez: School of Business, Universidad Nacional Intercultural de la Selva Central Juan Santos Atahualpa, La Merced 12856, Peru
Yadira Yanase-Rojas: School of Business, Universidad Tecnológica del Perú, Lima 15046, Peru
Jovany Pompilio Espinoza-Yangali: School of Business, Universidad Continental, Junín 12000, Peru

Games, 2025, vol. 16, issue 2, 1-19

Abstract: Our research analyzes the design of an auction model for railway transportation on the South-East Railway of Peru, managed by Ferrocarril Transandino S.A. (Fetransa) and operated by PeruRail. Initially, the regulatory framework aimed to promote competition in railway transportation through timetable auctions and infrastructure access. However, the concession has resulted in a vertically integrated structure that favors PeruRail, which faces minimal direct competition, controls high-demand time slots, and hinders the entry of other operators due to strategic and structural access barriers. To address these distortions, we propose reforming the auction mechanism to neutralize these advantages and enhance competition. In this revised framework, the track usage fee will serve as the competitive factor, with the highest bid above a minimum base rate securing the allocation. Additionally, we propose the implementation of asymmetric tariffs to compensate for the higher costs faced by operators with fewer economies of scale, technological optimizations to facilitate equitable access to time slots, and stricter oversight mechanisms to ensure transparency in timetable allocation. These measures aim to balance the market and safeguard competition through a more equitable and efficient auction design.

Keywords: auction theory; game theory; railway market; railway timetable (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/2/16/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/2/16/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:16:y:2025:i:2:p:16-:d:1629346

Access Statistics for this article

Games is currently edited by Ms. Susie Huang

More articles in Games from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().