The Role of Reputation in Sequel Production

Khac Minh Duc Do and Dmitriy Knyazev ()
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Khac Minh Duc Do: TWS Partners, 10117 Berlin, Germany
Dmitriy Knyazev: Department of Business Decisions and Analytics, University of Vienna, Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, 1180 Vienna, Austria

Games, 2025, vol. 16, issue 3, 1-7

Abstract: This paper develops a simple model of sequel production for experience goods, showing how reputation shapes a producer’s incentives. Producers differ in productivity, which determines how much effort they invest. A sequel is made only if the previous installment exceeds a quality threshold, capturing the idea that consumers base future consumption on past success. Although high-productivity producers create higher-quality originals and sequels, the conditioning on successful originals still makes sequels, on average, worse than their predecessors. This aligns with evidence of sequel underperformance in media markets.

Keywords: sequel; reputation; experience goods; producer incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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