Pool Formation with Three Patent Owners

Hao Liu, Xuewen Qian, Chen Qu and Jingyi Shen ()
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Hao Liu: Institute of International Law, School of Law, Shandong University, Qingdao 266237, China
Xuewen Qian: School of Economics, University of Nottingham Ningbo China, Ningbo 315100, China
Chen Qu: School of Economics, University of Nottingham Ningbo China, Ningbo 315100, China
Jingyi Shen: School of Finance and Trade, Wenzhou Business College, Wenzhou 325035, China

Games, 2025, vol. 16, issue 4, 1-17

Abstract: We analyze the endogenous formation of patent pools among three patent owners and the associated welfare effects. Under a condition of synergistic three-patent combination, either a unique symmetric equilibrium or infinitely many asymmetric equilibria can arise when patents are fragmented. By using the notion of equilibrium binding agreements, we show that (1) when there is a unique symmetric equilibrium under fragmented patents, the complete pool is both stable and welfare-maximizing; (2) fragmented patents are stable in the presence of infinitely many asymmetric equilibria; and (3) when considering only a single specific asymmetric equilibrium under fragmented patents, the complete pool is welfare-maximizing if it is stable, while fragmented patents can be both stable and welfare-maximizing under certain conditions. We also discuss an alternative version of synergism and an alternative bargaining protocol for patent pool formation.

Keywords: patent pool; coalition formation; synergism; asymmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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