Balanced Weights and Three-Sided Coalition Formation

Emiliya Lazarova and Dinko Dimitrov

Games, 2010, vol. 1, issue 2, 1-9

Abstract: We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided that the corresponding weights are balanced and each agent perceives the two types of status as being substitutable.

Keywords: core; hedonic games; three-sided matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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