The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games

Chen-Ying Huang and Tomas Sjostrom
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Chen-Ying Huang: Department of Economics, National Taiwan University, 21 Hsu-Chow Road, Taipei, Taiwan

Games, 2010, vol. 1, issue 2, 1-23

Abstract: We study the recursive core introduced in Huang and Sjöström [8]. In general partition function form games, the recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the recursive core structure is typically different from the one predicted by the ?-core. We fully implement the recursive core for general games, including non-superadditive games where the grand coalition does not form in equilibrium. We do not put any restrictions, such as stationarity, on strategies.

Keywords: coalition formation; non-cooperative implementation; partition function; recursive core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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