Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization

Sylvain Béal, Subhadip Chakrabarti, Amandine Ghintran and Philippe Solal

Games, 2010, vol. 1, issue 3, 1-19

Abstract: We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful.

Keywords: partial cooperative equilibrium; supermodular games; network formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Working Paper: Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization (2010)
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