Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games

Paulo Barelli

Games, 2010, vol. 1, issue 4, 1-7

Abstract: We introduce consistency of beliefs in the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi) and use it to provide epistemic conditions for equilibria in finite multi-stage games with observed actions.

Keywords: hierarchies of conditional beliefs; epistemic conditions; common belief; correlated subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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