The Existence of Perfect Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

Games, 2011, vol. 2, issue 3, 1-22

Abstract: We prove the existence of a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium within a class of compact, metric, and possibly discontinuous games. Our conditions for existence are easily verified in a variety of economic games.

Keywords: trembling-hand perfect equilibrium; discontinuous game; infinite normal-form game; payoff security (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

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