Voluntary versus Enforced Team Effort

Claudia Keser and Claude Montmarquette
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Claudia Keser: Faculty of Economic Sciences, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, Göttingen D-37073, Germany

Games, 2011, vol. 2, issue 3, 1-25

Abstract: We present a model where each of two players chooses between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the equilibrium strategy to choose private remuneration, we frequently observe both players to choose team remuneration in a series of laboratory experiments. This allows for high cooperation payoffs but also provides individual free-riding incentives. Due to significant cooperation, we observe that, in team remuneration, participants make higher profits than in private remuneration. We also observe that, when participants are not given the option of private remuneration, they cooperate significantly less.

Keywords: team effort; voluntary collaboration; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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