Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information

Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

Games, 2013, vol. 4, issue 3, 1-10

Abstract: We consider Rubinstein’s two-person alternating-offer bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information. We investigate the effects of one party having relative concerns about the bargaining outcome and the delay in reaching an agreement. We find that facing an opponent with stronger relative concerns only hurts the bargainer when she is stronger than her opponent. In addition, we show that an increase of one party’s relative concerns will decrease the maximum delay in reaching an agreement.

Keywords: relative concerns; alternating-offer bargaining; private information; maximal delays (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Relative concerns and delays in bargaining with private information (2013)
Working Paper: Relative concerns and delays in bargaining with private information (2013)
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