Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons

Joel Watson

Games, 2013, vol. 4, issue 3, 1-40

Abstract: This paper examines a general model of contract in multi-period settings with both external and self-enforcement. In the model, players alternately engage in contract negotiation and take individual actions. A notion of contractual equilibrium, which combines a bargaining solution and individual incentive constraints, is proposed and analyzed. The modeling framework helps identify the relation between the manner in which players negotiate and the outcome of the long-term contractual relationship. In particular, the model shows the importance of accounting for the self-enforced component of contract in the negotiation process. Examples and guidance for applications are provided, along with existence results and a result on a monotone relation between “activeness of contracting” and contractual equilibrium values.

Keywords: external enforcement; self-enforcement; negotiation; agreements; contractual equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons (2006)
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