Introducing Disappointment Dynamics and Comparing Behaviors in Evolutionary Games: Some Simulation Results

Tassos Patokos
Additional contact information
Tassos Patokos: University of Hertfordshire, Hertfordshire Business School, Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Hatfield, AL10 9AB, UK

Games, 2014, vol. 5, issue 1, 1-25

Abstract: The paper presents an evolutionary model, based on the assumption that agents may revise their current strategies if they previously failed to attain the maximum level of potential payoffs. We offer three versions of this reflexive mechanism, each one of which describes a distinct type: spontaneous agents, rigid players, and ‘satisficers’. We use simulations to examine the performance of these types. Agents who change their strategies relatively easily tend to perform better in coordination games, but antagonistic games generally lead to more favorable outcomes if the individuals only change their strategies when disappointment from previous rounds surpasses some predefined threshold.

Keywords: game theory; reinforcement learning; adaptive procedure; revision protocol; disappointment; simulations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/5/1/1/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/5/1/1/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:5:y:2014:i:1:p:1-25:d:32689

Access Statistics for this article

Games is currently edited by Ms. Susie Huang

More articles in Games from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().