Conditional Cooperation and the Marginal per Capita Return in Public Good Games

Edward Cartwright and Denise Lovett
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Denise Lovett: School of Economics, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NP, UK

Games, 2014, vol. 5, issue 4, 1-23

Abstract: We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The ‘standard’ game, in which three players contribute before a follower, is compared with a leader-follower game, in which one player leads and three follow. Even though we observe less conditional cooperation for an MPCR of 0.2, the prevalence of conditional cooperation remains relatively stable to changes in the MPCR and game timing. In contrast, the level of MPCR has a strong effect on unconditional contributions. Our results highlight the critical role played by leaders in a public good game.

Keywords: public good; conditional cooperation; reciprocity; leadership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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