On the Three-Person Game Baccara Banque

Stewart N. Ethier and Jiyeon Lee
Additional contact information
Stewart N. Ethier: Department of Mathematics, University of Utah, 155 South 1400 East, Salt Lake City, UT 84112, USA
Jiyeon Lee: Department of Statistics, Yeungnam University, 214-1 Daedong, Kyeongsan, Kyeongbuk 712-749, South Korea

Games, 2015, vol. 6, issue 2, 1-22

Abstract: Baccara banque is a three-person zero-sum game parameterized by \(\theta\in(0,1)\). A study of the game by Downton and Lockwood claimed that the Nash equilibrium is of only academic interest. Their preferred alternative is what we call the independent cooperative equilibrium . However, this solution exists only for certain \(\theta\). A third solution, which we call the correlated cooperative equilibrium , always exists. Under a ''with replacement'' assumption as well as a simplifying assumption concerning the information available to one of the players, we derive each of the three solutions for all \(\theta\).

Keywords: baccara banque; baccara à deux tableaux; three-person game; sampling with replacement; Nash equilibrium; independent cooperative equilibrium; correlated cooperative equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/6/2/57/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/6/2/57/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:6:y:2015:i:2:p:57-78:d:49324

Access Statistics for this article

Games is currently edited by Ms. Susie Huang

More articles in Games from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().