Malevolent Governance, Intra-Group Conflict and the Paradox of the Plenty: An Experiment
Klarizze Anne Puzon and
Marc Willinger ()
Games, 2015, vol. 7, issue 1, 1-11
Using a laboratory experiment, we behaviourally study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within-group conflict, i.e. , the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the first stage, a randomly-chosen leader of the group determines how much of the common-pool resource to protect from second-stage conflict. In the next stage, each group member allocates his private endowment between working or fighting for a share of the unprotected resource. We consider two treatments: anarchy (consisting of the second stage only) and with a leader deciding in the first stage. We find that the existence of institutions is not always better than anarchy. This is aggravated when the resource size is higher. Group conflict (income) decreases (increases) only when leaders chose the strongest resource protection. When leaders are malevolent, i.e. , they chose weak resource protection, outcomes are worse than when institutions are absent.
Keywords: paradox of the plenty; conflict; governance; natural resources; laboratory experiments; contests; C72; C91; D72; P48; Q33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Malevolent Governance, Intra-Group Conflict and the Paradox of the Plenty: An Experiment (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:7:y:2015:i:1:p:2-:d:61440
Access Statistics for this article
Games is currently edited by Prof. Dr. Ulrich Berger
More articles in Games from MDPI, Open Access Journal
Bibliographic data for series maintained by XML Conversion Team ().