The Evolution of Reputation-Based Cooperation in Regular Networks

Tatsuya Sasaki, Hitoshi Yamamoto, Isamu Okada and Satoshi Uchida
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Hitoshi Yamamoto: Faculty of Business Administration, Rissho University, 141-8602 Tokyo, Japan
Isamu Okada: Faculty of Business Administration, Soka University, 192-8577 Tokyo, Japan
Satoshi Uchida: Research Center for Ethiculture Studies, RINRI Institute, 102-8561 Tokyo, Japan

Games, 2017, vol. 8, issue 1, 1-16

Abstract: Despite recent advances in reputation technologies, it is not clear how reputation systems can affect human cooperation in social networks. Although it is known that two of the major mechanisms in the evolution of cooperation are spatial selection and reputation-based reciprocity, theoretical study of the interplay between both mechanisms remains almost uncharted. Here, we present a new individual-based model for the evolution of reciprocal cooperation between reputation and networks. We comparatively analyze four of the leading moral assessment rules—shunning, image scoring, stern judging, and simple standing—and base the model on the giving game in regular networks for Cooperators, Defectors, and Discriminators. Discriminators rely on a proper moral assessment rule. By using individual-based models, we show that the four assessment rules are differently characterized in terms of how cooperation evolves, depending on the benefit-to-cost ratio, the network-node degree, and the observation and error conditions. Our findings show that the most tolerant rule—simple standing—is the most robust among the four assessment rules in promoting cooperation in regular networks.

Keywords: evolution of cooperation; indirect reciprocity; structured population; social norm; private information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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