Watching Eyes and Living up to Expectations: Unkind, Not Kind, Eyes Increase First Mover Cooperation in a Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma

Loren Pauwels, Carolyn H. Declerck and Christophe Boone
Additional contact information
Loren Pauwels: Department of Management, Faculty of Applied Economics, University of Antwerp, Prinsstraat 13, Antwerpen 2000, Belgium
Carolyn H. Declerck: Department of Management, Faculty of Applied Economics, University of Antwerp, Prinsstraat 13, Antwerpen 2000, Belgium
Christophe Boone: Department of Management, Faculty of Applied Economics, University of Antwerp, Prinsstraat 13, Antwerpen 2000, Belgium

Games, 2017, vol. 8, issue 2, 1-13

Abstract: (1) Background: Why and when images of watching eyes encourage prosocial behavior is still subject to discussion, and two recent meta-analyses show no effect of watching eyes on generosity. This study aims to discern the effect of watching eyes of different valence on two separate aspects of prosocial behavior, and additionally investigates whether individuals’ social value orientation moderates the effect of eyes. (2) Methods: Individuals take on the role of either a first or second mover in an incentivized, anonymous sequential prisoner’s dilemma ( n = 247), a two-person game which separates the need to form expectations about the other player (first mover cooperation, trust) from the motive of greed (second mover cooperation, reciprocity). During decision-making, a picture of either kind eyes, unkind eyes, or a control picture is presented above each decision matrix. (3) Results: The results indicate that unkind eyes, and not kind eyes, significantly boost first mover cooperation. In contrast, neither type of eye cues increase second mover cooperation. Social value orientation does not moderate these effects. (4) Conclusions: Thus, the data suggest that the valence of eye cues matters, and we propose that unkind eyes urge first movers to live up to the interaction partner’s expectations.

Keywords: watching eyes; valence; sequential prisoner’s dilemma; expectations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/2/20/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/2/20/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:8:y:2017:i:2:p:20-:d:95455

Access Statistics for this article

Games is currently edited by Ms. Susie Huang

More articles in Games from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().