Multi-Leader Multi-Follower Model with Aggregative Uncertainty

Lina Mallozzi and Roberta Messalli
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Lina Mallozzi: Department of Mathematics and Applications, University of Naples Federico II, Via Claudio 21, 80125 Naples, Italy
Roberta Messalli: Department of Economic and Statistic Science, University of Naples Federico II, Complesso Monte Sant’Angelo 21, 80125 Naples, Italy

Games, 2017, vol. 8, issue 3, 1-14

Abstract: We study a non-cooperative game with aggregative structure, namely when the payoffs depend on the strategies of the opponent players through an aggregator function. We assume that a subset of players behave as leaders in a Stackelberg model. The leaders, as well the followers, act non-cooperatively between themselves and solve a Nash equilibrium problem. We assume an exogenous uncertainty affecting the aggregator and we obtain existence results for the stochastic resulting game. Some examples are illustrated.

Keywords: aggregative game; hierarchical model; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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