Game Theory of Pollution: National Policies and Their International Effects
Katharina Schüller (),
Kateřina Staňková () and
Frank Thuijsman ()
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Katharina Schüller: Department of Data Science and Knowledge Engineering, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
Kateřina Staňková: Department of Data Science and Knowledge Engineering, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
Frank Thuijsman: Department of Data Science and Knowledge Engineering, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
Games, 2017, vol. 8, issue 3, 1-15
In this paper we put forward a simple game-theoretical model of pollution control, where each country is in control of its own pollution, while the environmental effects of policies do not stop at country borders. In our noncooperative differential game, countries as players minimize the present value of their own costs defined as a linear combination of pollution costs and costs of environmentally friendly policies, where the state vector of the system consists of the pollution stock per country. A player’s time-varying decision is her investment into clean policies, while her expected costs include also pollution caused by her neighbors. We analyze three variants of this game: (1) a Nash game in which each player chooses her investment into clean policies such that her expected costs are minimal, (2) a game in which the players imitate the investments into clean policies of their neighbors without taking the neighbor’s success concerning their costs into account and (3) a game in which each player imitates her neighbors’ investments into clean policies if this behavior seems to bring a profit. In each of these scenarios, we show under which conditions the countries have incentives to act environmentally friendly. We argue that the different results of these games can be used to understand and design effective environmental policies.
Keywords: pollution; game theory; optimal control; imitation; cooperation; Nash game; Stackelberg game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:8:y:2017:i:3:p:30-:d:104982
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