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A Note on Disbelief in Others regarding Backward Induction

Andreas Tutić and Sascha Grehl
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Andreas Tutić: Institute of Sociology, Leipzig University, 04107 Leipzig, Germany
Sascha Grehl: Institute of Sociology, Leipzig University, 04107 Leipzig, Germany

Games, 2017, vol. 8, issue 3, 1-7

Abstract: We present experimental results on the role of beliefs in the cognitive ability of others in a problem involving backward induction. Using a modified version of the so-called race game, our design allows the effects of a player’s own inability to perform backward induction to be separated from the effects of her disbelief in the ability of others to do so. We find that behavior is responsive to the dependence on others who might fail in backward induction as well as information regarding their backward induction skills.

Keywords: backward induction; iterative thinking; beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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