Instability of Mixed Nash Equilibria in Generalised Hawk-Dove Game: A Project Conflict Management Scenario

Sheryl Le Chang and Mikhail Prokopenko
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Sheryl Le Chang: Complex Systems Research Group, Faculty of Engineering and IT, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia
Mikhail Prokopenko: Complex Systems Research Group, Faculty of Engineering and IT, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia

Games, 2017, vol. 8, issue 4, 1-18

Abstract: This paper generalises the Hawk-Dove evolutionary game by introducing cost sharing ratios for both players, and applies the generalised Hawk-Dove model to conflict management in projects through investigating the stability of Nash equilibria. A model with clashing interests between a project owner and a contractor is considered to derive their strategy adaptation given the cost sharing ratios. As expected, the pure Nash equilibria are shown to be dominantly stable while the mixed strategy equilibrium is observed to be unstable, across the range of considered cost sharing ratios. In addition, simulations are conducted on the strategy adaptation and stability of the equilibria under noisy and latent conditions. The obtained results can be used by project managers in optimising their strategy in practice.

Keywords: evolutionary game theory; project conflict management; Nash equilibrium; Hawk-Dove game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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