Does Imperfect Data Privacy Stop People from Collecting Personal Data?

Simeon Schudy and Verena Utikal
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Verena Utikal: University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Lange Gasse 20, D-90403 Nürnberg, Germany

Games, 2018, vol. 9, issue 1, 1-23

Abstract: Many companies try to access personal information to discriminate among consumers. We analyse how privacy regulations affect the acquisition and disclosure of information in a simple game of persuasion. Theory predicts that no data will be acquired with Disclosure Duty of collected data whereas Consent Law with perfect privacy results in complete information acquisition. Imperfect privacy, i.e., an environment in which leaks of collected data are possible, gives rise to multiple equilibria. Results from a laboratory experiment confirm the qualitative differences between Consent Law and Disclosure Duty and show that imperfect privacy does not stop people from collecting personal information.

Keywords: data privacy; endogenous information acquisition; experiment; unravelling; health (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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