Intention-Based Sharing

Daniela Di Cagno, Arianna Galliera, Werner Güth and Luca Panaccione
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Werner Güth: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, 53133, Germany

Games, 2018, vol. 9, issue 2, 1-24

Abstract: How are allocation results affected by information that another anonymous participant intends to be more or less generous? We explore this experimentally via two participants facing the same allocation task with only one actually giving after possible adjustment of own generosity based on the other’s intended generosity. Participants successively face three game types, the ultimatum, yes-no and impunity game, or (between subjects) in the reverse order. Although only the impunity game appeals to intrinsic generosity, we confirm conditioning even when sanctioning is possible. Based on our data, we distinguish two major types of participants in all three games: one yielding to the weakest social influence and the other immune to it and offering much less. This is particularly interesting in the impunity game where other-regarding concerns are minimal.

Keywords: (conditional) generosity; ultimatum game; yes-no game; impunity game; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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