Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance
Games, 2018, vol. 9, issue 2, 1-67
Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces. Paying particular attention to the work of young researchers, this essay surveys the progress made over the last decade towards understanding these phenomena, and discusses open research topics of importance to economics and the broader social sciences.
Keywords: evolution; game theory; dynamics; agency; assortativity; culture; distributed systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:9:y:2018:i:2:p:31-:d:148859
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