On the Stability of Couples

Tobias Hiller
Additional contact information
Tobias Hiller: Institute for Theoretical Economics, University of Leipzig, D-04109 Leipzig, Germany

Games, 2018, vol. 9, issue 3, 1-10

Abstract: In this article, we analyze the stability of couples on the marriage market. Recent developments in cooperative game theory allow a new model that uses team games which make it possible to model the marriage market. Coalition structures can model couples. We analyze two cases: a symmetrical one with only one type of men and one type of women; and one with several types of women and men.

Keywords: team games; ?-value; stability of couples; marriage market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/3/48/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/3/48/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:9:y:2018:i:3:p:48-:d:157419

Access Statistics for this article

Games is currently edited by Ms. Susie Huang

More articles in Games from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().