Coordination and Private Information Revelation
Debdatta Saha () and
Prabal Roy Chowdhury ()
Additional contact information
Debdatta Saha: Faculty of Economics, South Asian University, Akbar Bhawan, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi 110021, India
Prabal Roy Chowdhury: Economics and Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, 7, S.J.S. Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi 110016, India
Games, 2018, vol. 9, issue 3, 1-21
This paper examines a persuasion game between two agents with one-sided asymmetric information, where the informed agent can reveal her private information prior to playing a Battle-of-the-Sexes coordination game. There is a close connection between the extent of information revelation and the possibility of coordination failure; while, in the absence of any coordination failure, there exist equilibria with full disclosure, in the presence of strategic uncertainty in coordination there exists an equilibrium with no information revelation. We provide a purification argument for the non-existence result, as well demonstrate that it is robust to several extensions, including both-sided asymmetric information and imprecise information revelation.
Keywords: private information revelation; coordination; strategic uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jgames:v:9:y:2018:i:3:p:64-:d:167793
Access Statistics for this article
Games is currently edited by Prof. Dr. Ulrich Berger
More articles in Games from MDPI, Open Access Journal
Bibliographic data for series maintained by XML Conversion Team ().