Coordination and Private Information Revelation

Debdatta Saha and Prabal Roy Chowdhury ()
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Debdatta Saha: Faculty of Economics, South Asian University, Akbar Bhawan, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi 110021, India

Games, 2018, vol. 9, issue 3, 1-21

Abstract: This paper examines a persuasion game between two agents with one-sided asymmetric information, where the informed agent can reveal her private information prior to playing a Battle-of-the-Sexes coordination game. There is a close connection between the extent of information revelation and the possibility of coordination failure; while, in the absence of any coordination failure, there exist equilibria with full disclosure, in the presence of strategic uncertainty in coordination there exists an equilibrium with no information revelation. We provide a purification argument for the non-existence result, as well demonstrate that it is robust to several extensions, including both-sided asymmetric information and imprecise information revelation.

Keywords: private information revelation; coordination; strategic uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C C7 C70 C71 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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