Playing Chemical Plant Environmental Protection Games with Historical Monitoring Data

Zhengqiu Zhu, Bin Chen, Genserik Reniers, Laobing Zhang, Sihang Qiu and Xiaogang Qiu
Additional contact information
Zhengqiu Zhu: College of Information System and Management, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China
Bin Chen: College of Information System and Management, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China
Genserik Reniers: Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Safety and Security Science Group (S3G), Delft University of Technology (TU Delft), 2628 BX Delft, The Netherlands
Laobing Zhang: Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Safety and Security Science Group (S3G), Delft University of Technology (TU Delft), 2628 BX Delft, The Netherlands
Sihang Qiu: College of Information System and Management, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China
Xiaogang Qiu: College of Information System and Management, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China

IJERPH, 2017, vol. 14, issue 10, 1-23

Abstract: The chemical industry is very important for the world economy and this industrial sector represents a substantial income source for developing countries. However, existing regulations on controlling atmospheric pollutants, and the enforcement of these regulations, often are insufficient in such countries. As a result, the deterioration of surrounding ecosystems and a quality decrease of the atmospheric environment can be observed. Previous works in this domain fail to generate executable and pragmatic solutions for inspection agencies due to practical challenges. In addressing these challenges, we introduce a so-called Chemical Plant Environment Protection Game (CPEP) to generate reasonable schedules of high-accuracy air quality monitoring stations (i.e., daily management plans) for inspection agencies. First, so-called Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) in conjunction with source estimation methods are applied into this research. Second, high-accuracy air quality monitoring stations as well as gas sensor modules are modeled in the CPEP game. Third, simplified data analysis on the regularly discharging of chemical plants is utilized to construct the CPEP game. Finally, an illustrative case study is used to investigate the effectiveness of the CPEP game, and a realistic case study is conducted to illustrate how the models and algorithms being proposed in this paper, work in daily practice. Results show that playing a CPEP game can reduce operational costs of high-accuracy air quality monitoring stations. Moreover, evidence suggests that playing the game leads to more compliance from the chemical plants towards the inspection agencies. Therefore, the CPEP game is able to assist the environmental protection authorities in daily management work and reduce the potential risks of gaseous pollutants dispersion incidents.

Keywords: Chemical Plant Environmental Protection; Stackelberg Security Games; source estimation methods; historical monitoring data; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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