Upstream-Downstream Joint Carbon Reduction Strategies Based on Low-Carbon Promotion

Xiqiang Xia, Junhu Ruan, Zhiru Juan, Yan Shi, Xuping Wang and Felix T. S. Chan
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Xiqiang Xia: Business School, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China
Junhu Ruan: Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Hong Kong, China
Zhiru Juan: School of Economics and Management, Huaiyin Normal University, Huaian 223300, China
Yan Shi: General Education Center, Tokai University, Kumamoto 862-8652, Japan
Xuping Wang: Institute of Systems Engineering, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China
Felix T. S. Chan: Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Hong Kong, China

IJERPH, 2018, vol. 15, issue 7, 1-16

Abstract: A differential game model is established to analyze the impact of emissions reduction efforts and low-carbon product promotion on the reduction strategies of low-carbon product manufacturers (subsequently referred to as manufacturers) and the retailers of such products in a dynamic environment. Based on this model, changes in emissions reduction efforts and promotional efforts are comparatively analyzed under three scenarios (retailers bearing the promotional cost, manufacturers bearing the promotional cost, and centralized decision-making). The results are as follows: (1) the trajectory of carbon emissions reduction per product unit is the highest when the supply chain is under centralized decision-making, followed by when manufacturers bear the promotional cost, and lastly when retailers bear the cost; (2) when manufacturers bear the promotional cost, the market demand, emissions reduction effort, and promotional effort are higher, although the unit retail price is higher than when retailers bear the promotional cost; and (3) under centralized decision-making, the unit retail price is the lowest; however, sales volume, the emissions reduction effort, and the promotional effort are all higher than those in the other scenarios.

Keywords: carbon reduction; low-carbon promotion; differential game model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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