An Evolutionary Game Model for Industrial Pollution Management under Two Punishment Mechanisms

Chuansheng Wang and Fulei Shi
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Chuansheng Wang: School of Management and Engineering, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China
Fulei Shi: School of Management and Engineering, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China

IJERPH, 2019, vol. 16, issue 15, 1-15

Abstract: In recent years, with the rapid development of the economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model for industrial pollution between the local governments and enterprises to study the dynamic evolution path of a game system and the evolutionary stable strategy under two punishment mechanisms. The results show that, in a static punishment mechanism (SPM), the strategy between governments and enterprises is uncertain. Moreover, the evolutionary trajectory between governments and enterprises is uncertain. However, under the dynamic punishment mechanism (DPM), the evolution path between governments and enterprises tends to converge to a stable value. Thus, the DPM is more conducive than the SPM for industrial pollution control.

Keywords: evolutionary games; industrial pollution; static punishment mechanism; dynamic punishment mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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