The Relationship among Government, Enterprise, and Public in Environmental Governance from the Perspective of Multi-Player Evolutionary Game

Yingxin Chen, Jing Zhang, Pandu R. Tadikamalla and Xutong Gao
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Yingxin Chen: School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, China
Jing Zhang: School of Information Science and Engineering, University of Jinan, Jinan 250022, China
Pandu R. Tadikamalla: Joseph M.Katz Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA
Xutong Gao: School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, China

IJERPH, 2019, vol. 16, issue 18, 1-17

Abstract: Environmental governance is an important component of the national governance system. China’s current environmental problems are particularly complex. How to let the government, enterprises, and the public participate in environmental governance is the key to enhance the ability of environmental governance. Based on the evolutionary game theory, the interaction and influencing factors among enterprise pollution control, government supervision, and public participation are analyzed, and the empirical analysis is carried out based on China’s 30 provincial panel data from 2009 to 2018. The research results show that government supervision has a positive effect on the environmental governance and can urge enterprises to actively perform pollution control. The effect of government supervision is constrained by the income and cost of enterprises, and the penalties for passive pollution control should be raised. At the same time, improving the government’s reputation loss can effectively stimulate the government’s environmental supervision behavior. Public participation significantly promotes the governance effect of three industrial wastes, and the enthusiasm of public participation is closely related to participation cost and psychological benefits. Public participation can replace government supervision to a certain extent. The interaction between government and public has a positive effect on environmental governance. The research results will help to build an effective environmental governance system and improve environmental governance performance and public satisfaction.

Keywords: environmental governance; public participation; government supervision; multi-player evolutionary game; participation mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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