Strategically Patrolling in a Chemical Cluster Addressing Gas Pollutants’ Releases through a Game-Theoretic Model

Bin Chen, Zhengqiu Zhu, Feiran Chen, Yong Zhao and Xiaogang Qiu
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Bin Chen: College of System Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China
Zhengqiu Zhu: College of System Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China
Feiran Chen: College of System Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China
Yong Zhao: College of System Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China
Xiaogang Qiu: College of System Engineering, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China

IJERPH, 2019, vol. 16, issue 4, 1-18

Abstract: Chemical production activities in chemical clusters, if not well managed, will pose great threats to the surrounding air environment and impose great burden on emergency handling. Therefore, it is urgent and substantial in a chemical cluster to develop proper and suitable pollution controlling strategies for an inspection agency to monitor chemical production processes. Apart from the static monitoring resources (e.g., monitoring stations and gas sensor modules), patrolling by mobile vehicle resources is arranged for better detecting the illegal releasing behaviors of emission spots in different chemical plants. However, it has been proven that the commonly used patrolling strategies (i.e., the fixed route strategy and the purely randomized route strategy) are non-optimal and fail to interact with intelligent chemical plants. Therefore, we proposed the Chemical Cluster Environmental Protection Patrolling (CCEPP) game to tackle the problem in this paper. Through combining the source estimation process, the game is modeled to detect the illegal releasing behaviors of chemical plants by randomly and strategically arranging the patrolling routes and intensities in different chemical sites. In this game-theoretic model, players (patroller and chemical sites), strategies, payoffs, and game solvers are modeled in sequence. More importantly, this game model also considers traffic delays or bounded cognition of patrollers on patrolling plans. Therefore, a discrete Markov decision process was used to model this stochastic process. Further, the model is illustrated by a case study. Results imply that the patrolling strategy suggested by the CCEPP game outperforms both the fixed route strategy and the purely randomized route strategy.

Keywords: chemical cluster environmental protection patrolling game; source estimation process; patrolling strategy; fixed route strategy; purely randomized route strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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