PM 2.5 Cooperative Control with Fuzzy Cost and Fuzzy Coalitions

Zhen Zhou, Meijia Zhang, Xiaohui Yu, Xijun He, Kang Wang, Quan Shao, Jie Wang and Hongxia Sun
Additional contact information
Zhen Zhou: School of Management, Capital Normal University, Beijing 100089, China
Meijia Zhang: School of Management, Capital Normal University, Beijing 100089, China
Xiaohui Yu: School of Logistics, Beijing Wuzi University, Beijing 101149, China
Xijun He: College of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124, China
Kang Wang: School of Management, Capital Normal University, Beijing 100089, China
Quan Shao: School of Economics and Management Engineering, Beijing University of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Beijing 100044, China
Jie Wang: School of Management, Capital Normal University, Beijing 100089, China
Hongxia Sun: School of Business, Beijing Industrial and Commercial University, Beijing 100084, China

IJERPH, 2019, vol. 16, issue 7, 1-14

Abstract: Haze control cost is hard to value by a crisp number because it is often affected by various factors such as regional uncertain meteorological conditions and topographical features. Furthermore, regions may be involved in different coalitions for haze control with different levels of effort. In this paper, we propose a PM 2.5 cooperative control model with fuzzy cost and crisp coalitions or fuzzy coalitions based on the uncertain cross-border transmission factor. We focus on the Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei regions of China and obtain the following major findings. In the case of haze control in the Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei regions of China, local governments in the global crisp coalition can achieve their emission reduction targets with the lowest aggregated cost. However, Hebei fails to satisfy its individual rationality if there is no cost sharing. Therefore, the Hukuhara–Shapley value is used to allocate the aggregated cost among these regions so that the grand coalition is stable. However, the Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei regions cannot achieve their emission reduction targets in the global fuzzy coalition without government subsidies.

Keywords: PM 2.5 control; fuzzy cooperative game; interval number; Hukuhara–Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/16/7/1271/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/16/7/1271/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:16:y:2019:i:7:p:1271-:d:221299

Access Statistics for this article

IJERPH is currently edited by Ms. Jenna Liu

More articles in IJERPH from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().