Optimal Decisions for Two Risk-Averse Competitive Manufacturers under the Cap-and-Trade Policy and Uncertain Demand
Hongxia Sun,
Jie Yang and
Yang Zhong
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Hongxia Sun: Business School, Beijing Technology and Business University, Beijing 100048, China
Jie Yang: Business School, Beijing Technology and Business University, Beijing 100048, China
Yang Zhong: Business School, Beijing Technology and Business University, Beijing 100048, China
IJERPH, 2020, vol. 17, issue 3, 1-17
Abstract:
With the increasingly serious problem of environmental pollution, reducing carbon emissions has become an urgent task for all countries. The cap-and-trade (C&T) policy has gained international recognition and has been adopted by several countries. In this paper, considering the uncertainty of market demand, we discuss the carbon emission reduction and price policies of two risk-averse competitive manufacturers under the C&T policy. The two manufacturers have two competitive behaviors: simultaneous decision making and sequential decision making. Two models were constructed for these behaviors. The optimal decisions, carbon emission reduction rate, and price were obtained from these two models. Furthermore, in this paper the effects of some key parameters on the optimal decision are discussed, and some managerial insights are obtained. The results show that the lower the manufacturers’ risk aversion level is, the higher their carbon emission reduction rate and utilities. As the carbon quota increases, the manufacturers’ optimal carbon reduction rate and utilities increase. Considering consumers’ environmental awareness, it is more beneficial for the government to reduce the carbon quota and motivate manufacturers’ internal enthusiasm for emission reduction. The government can, through macro control of the market, make carbon trading prices increase appropriately and encourage manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions.
Keywords: supply chain; cap-and-trade; risk-averse; carbon emission reduction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:17:y:2020:i:3:p:1010-:d:316876
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