Evolutionary Process of Promoting Construction Safety Education to Avoid Construction Safety Accidents in China

Feng Guo, Junwu Wang, Denghui Liu and Yinghui Song
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Feng Guo: School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
Junwu Wang: School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China
Denghui Liu: China Construction First Group Corporation Limited, Beijing 100161, China
Yinghui Song: School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, China

IJERPH, 2021, vol. 18, issue 19, 1-22

Abstract: Construction safety is related to the life and health of construction workers and has always been a hot issue of concern for government and construction units. The government can use “construction safety education” to reduce the probability of safety accidents in the construction process and avoid the loss of life and property of construction workers. To encourage construction units to provide safety education for construction workers before construction starts and promote construction workers to actively participate in safety education. In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model of government–construction units–construction workers is established, and the factors affecting each party’s behavior strategy are comprehensively analyzed. Firstly, evolutionary game theory is used to investigate the influence of different behavior strategies among government, construction units, and construction workers on the behavior strategies of the other two parties. Secondly, according to the events in different situations, the influence of critical factors on the evolution process of the model is analyzed. On this basis, combined with the construction experience and construction data of actual construction projects, the established model and preliminary conclusions are verified. Finally, a sensitivity analysis of all parameters is carried out. The results show that: (1) The government’s enhancement of reward and punishment is conducive to promoting the choice of "providing safety education" for construction orders and the choice of “actively participating in safety education” for construction workers, but the excessive reward will lead to the government’s unwillingness of participation; (2) The reasonable reward and punishment mechanism set by the government must meet the condition that the sum of rewards and punishments for all parties is more significant than their speculative gains, to ensure the construction safety under the evolutionary stability; (3) Increasing welfare subsidies for construction workers who choose to participate in safety education actively is an effective way to avoid unwilling participation of construction workers.

Keywords: construction safety education; trilateral evolutionary game; simulation analysis; reward and punishment mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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