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Evolutionary Games of Low-Carbon Behaviors of Construction Stakeholders under Carbon Taxes

Qiang Du, Yunqing Yan, Youdan Huang, Chanchan Hao and Jiao Wu
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Qiang Du: School of Economics and Management, Chang’an University, Xi’an 710064, China
Yunqing Yan: School of Economics and Management, Chang’an University, Xi’an 710064, China
Youdan Huang: School of Economics and Management, Chang’an University, Xi’an 710064, China
Chanchan Hao: School of Economics and Management, Chang’an University, Xi’an 710064, China
Jiao Wu: School of Economics and Management, Chang’an University, Xi’an 710064, China

IJERPH, 2021, vol. 18, issue 2, 1-20

Abstract: The development of low-carbon buildings (LCBs) in China has not reached its expected status, although the Chinese government has formulated many relevant regulations. The real estate developers and consumers are essential participants in the development of LCBs. This paper explores whether the government’s implementation of the carbon tax will change their choices of LCBs. Evolutionary game models between developers and consumers are established under static and dynamic carbon taxes. Their evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) are deduced in different situations. According to the real scenarios in China, numerical simulations are further conducted to show that carbon tax influences the low-carbon behaviors of stakeholders in the construction industry. Under a static carbon tax, the two players cannot reach an equilibrium state, while the game system is stable under a dynamic tax. The probability of the developers constructing LCBs is positively related to the carbon tax, while its degree is gradually weakened as the tax rate increases. Therefore, an appropriate tax should be set to promote the development of LCBs effectively. Finally, policy implications are put forwarded to guide the participants’ low-carbon behaviors and reduce the carbon emissions in the Chinese construction industry.

Keywords: low-carbon buildings; carbon tax; evolutionary game; low-carbon behaviors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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