Research on the Evolution of the Express Packaging Recycling Strategy, Considering Government Subsidies and Synergy Benefits

Yanlu Guo, Gongli Luo and Guisheng Hou
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Yanlu Guo: College of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China
Gongli Luo: College of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China
Guisheng Hou: College of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China

IJERPH, 2021, vol. 18, issue 3, 1-25

Abstract: With the year-on-year growth of e-commerce transactions and the increasing popularity of the concept of ecological civilization, the waste and recycling of express packages have aroused widespread discussion and attention. On the issue of express package recycling, how consumers, e-commerce enterprises, and e-commerce platforms choose their own strategies, how to better promote the recycling of express packages, and what is the effect mechanism of government subsidies on different players. These are the questions that this article wants to answer. Since this article involves many stakeholders, in order to better identify the strategic choice and evolution of different entities and to better study the influence of government subsidies on the strategic choice of game players, this article uses two triparty evolutionary game models. The results show that without subsidies, changes in the rate of return and the initial probability will affect the evolution of the equilibrium strategy, while the synergistic benefits will have a corrective effect in some cases; when government subsidies are included and the probability of the three parties choosing “green strategies” is relatively low, subsidies should be paid to e-commerce companies mainly; lower subsidies can only provide incentives for e-commerce platforms. This article can provide certain references and value for government policymakers.

Keywords: express packaging; heterogeneous parties; government subsidies; evolutionary game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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