Role of Enterprise Alliance in Carbon Emission Reduction Mechanism: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

Jichao Geng (), Meiyu Ji and Li Yang
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Jichao Geng: School of Economics and Management, Anhui University of Science and Technology, Huainan 232001, China
Meiyu Ji: School of Economics and Management, Anhui University of Science and Technology, Huainan 232001, China
Li Yang: School of Economics and Management, Anhui University of Science and Technology, Huainan 232001, China

IJERPH, 2022, vol. 19, issue 18, 1-17

Abstract: This study constructs the enterprise alliance game party, designs the mechanism for which the alliance and the government are jointly responsible for enterprise carbon emission reduction work, and explores the evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) of the government, enterprises, and enterprise alliance under the policy of carbon tax and carbon trading with numerical simulations. The results show that: (1) the ESSs of the enterprise alliance are always to give technical support to enterprises; (2) the carbon trading price below the critical value can mobilize the enthusiasm of enterprises for honest emission reduction; (3) the carbon tax rate has a negative correlation with enterprise emission reduction behavior; (4) when the underreported carbon emissions of enterprises exceed the critical value, the enterprise will evolve into dishonest emission reduction. The high carbon emissions underreported by enterprises will mobilize the enthusiasm of the government to choose supervision. This study may be of certain reference significance to optimize the existing carbon emission reduction mechanism and achieve win-win cooperation between enterprises and government in the carbon trading market.

Keywords: carbon tax; carbon trading; enterprise alliance; evolutionary game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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