Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government and Residents’ Participation in Waste Separation Based on Cumulative Prospect Theory

Lichi Zhang (), Yanyan Jiang and Junmin Wu
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Lichi Zhang: School of Economics and Management, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212000, China
Yanyan Jiang: School of Economics and Management, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212000, China
Junmin Wu: School of Economics and Management, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212000, China

IJERPH, 2022, vol. 19, issue 21, 1-16

Abstract: Government and residents’ participation in waste separation is a complex non-cooperative game process, and the evolutionary game can explain the behavior of participating subjects well. Considering that the traditional evolutionary game cannot satisfactorily explain the irrational psychology and risk preference factors of the participating issues, this study combines the prospect theory and evolutionary game, uses the prospect value function to supplement and improve the parameters of the evolutionary game payment matrix, and analyzes the evolutionary stabilization strategy. To verify the theoretical results, simulation experiments and impact analysis were conducted, and meaningful results were obtained: There are two stable evolutionary strategies in the system, namely higher participation benefits for residents and lower participation costs and opportunity costs, and reasonable direct benefit distribution coefficients all help to increase the participation rate of waste separation. This study can provide some scientific suggestions for the government to design and build a waste-separation system.

Keywords: waste separation; residents; government; evolutionary game; cumulative prospect theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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