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Research on Evolutionary Game of Water Environment Governance Behavior from the Perspective of Public Participation

Meng Sun, Xukuo Gao (), Jinze Li and Xiaodong Jing
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Meng Sun: School of Management, Xi’an University of Architecture and Technology, Xi’an 710055, China
Xukuo Gao: School of Management, Xi’an University of Architecture and Technology, Xi’an 710055, China
Jinze Li: School of Management, Xi’an University of Architecture and Technology, Xi’an 710055, China
Xiaodong Jing: Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China

IJERPH, 2022, vol. 19, issue 22, 1-17

Abstract: As an informal environmental regulation, public participation plays a vital role in the multi-governance environmental system. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs the game models of government enterprise, public enterprise and government public enterprise, and analyzes the impact of different intensity of government behavior and public participation on enterprise behavior strategies. The results show that: (1) In the two-party evolutionary game, the behavior of each stakeholder is related to its costs and benefits. Still, effective public participation allows the enterprise to choose legal discharge, even if the benefits of legal discharge are smaller than illegal discharge. (2) In the three-party evolutionary game, the steady-state conditions of government and the public are the same as those in two-party evolutionary game models. However, the decision-making behavior of enterprises also needed to consider the impact of public whistle-blowing on their reputation and image. (3) With the increase of the government’s ecological protection publicity, subsidies, fines, public concern, and whistle-blowing, the evolution speed of the enterprise towards legal discharge is faster.

Keywords: public participation; collaborative governance; evolutionary game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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